Introduction
The EU-facilitated normalization dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina remains one of the most complex political processes in the Western Balkans. Despite more than a decade of negotiations, implementation gaps, mutual distrust and public skepticism continue to undermine its credibility. Progress in the dialogue directly conditions Serbia’s and Kosovo’s advancement in the EU accession process and affects regional stability.
Young people constitute one of the most affected groups in this context. Youth unemployment in both Serbia and Kosovo remains among the highest in Europe, while restricted mobility, mutual non-recognition of documents and segregated education systems shape everyday life. At the same time, young people express the lowest levels of trust in political institutions and the highest willingness to emigrate.
This paper argues that young people from Serbia and Kosovo should be recognized not as passive beneficiaries of the normalization process, but as co-creators of peace and long-term stability. Drawing on insights from the Winter School in North Mitrovica and from my practical experience in grassroots youth work, youth need to be more engaged in dialogue of normalization process.
Youth as Agents of Change in Post-Conflict Societies
The peace building process highlights the transformative potential of youth in divided societies. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security stresses that youth play a positive role in preventing conflict and sustaining peace when they are provided with opportunities for participation. Yet, in Serbia and Kosovo, youth are rarely included in formal consultation mechanisms related to the dialogue.
Studies conducted by the Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO) indicate that young people who participate in regional exchanges demonstrate higher levels of trust towards peers from other communities and lower susceptibility to nationalist narratives. These findings suggest that exposure to cross-border cooperation reshapes perceptions more effectively than top-down political messaging.
Political Agreements and Social Normalization
One of the central weaknesses of the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue is the absence of comprehensive social dialogue. Agreements related to freedom of movement, recognition of diplomas or energy often remain abstract for the public. Civil society monitoring initiatives have highlighted gaps in transparency and inconsistent implementation of normalization commitments. CEP’s project on civil society-led monitoring aims to strengthen collaborative oversight of the Belgrade–Pristina dialogue and promote transparency in implementation mechanisms.
Youth organizations can address social normalization on community-level. Youth Initiative for Human Rights has organized cross-border dialogue with youth from Kosovo and Serbia. Such initiatives demonstrate how youth can translate political processes into comprehensive social issues, increasing public youth participation too.
Media, Misinformation and Youth Narratives
Media polarization represents another major challenge to normalization. Media in both Serbia and Kosovo continue to frame the dialogue through confrontational narratives, reinforcing fear and mistrust. News about the normalization process between Serbia and Kosovo is often shaped by national political agendas rather than by balanced reporting. Pro-government outlets in both societies frequently frame developments in the dialogue as victories or betrayals, reinforcing polarization instead of explaining the substance of agreements. Sensationalist headlines and selective use of facts create confusion about what has actually been negotiated or implemented.
Also, disinformation campaigns, especially on social media, spread rumors about security threats, secret concessions or the alleged collapse of talks. These narratives are amplified through online networks and partisan portals that rarely verify sources. As a result, citizens struggle to distinguish between official positions, speculation and deliberate manipulation. Without systematic efforts to address media bias and disinformation, the normalization process will remain vulnerable to manipulation and public rejection.
Civil society and independent media initiatives attempt to counter this trend by fact-checking claims and offering contextualized explanations of the dialogue.
Young people, who rely heavily on digital platforms for news, are particularly exposed to misleading content. Young people are increasingly consuming news through social media platforms rather than traditional outlets. This shift creates both risks and opportunities. On the one hand, disinformation spreads rapidly in online environments. On the other hand, youth-led digital initiatives can counteract dominant narratives. Platforms such as Sbunker in Kosovo provide alternative storytelling spaces that promote dialogue and pluralism. Empowering youth to produce content, fact-check claims and critically analyze information is therefore central to social and political normalization too.
Structural barriers to youth participation
Structural barriers continue to limit meaningful youth participation in Kosovo, particularly in initiatives aimed at normalizing relations between Serbs and Albanians. One of the most significant obstacles is geographical segregation.
Many young people grow up in ethnically homogeneous communities, attend separate schools and have little opportunity for contact with peers from other communities. This separation is reinforced by restricted mobility, language barriers and limited transport connections between areas predominantly inhabited by Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs.
A second barrier is the lack of institutional inclusion. Youth are rarely consulted in decision-making related to the dialogue process, and existing youth councils or advisory bodies have limited influence. Participation is often symbolic, reducing young people to project beneficiaries rather than partners in shaping policies.
Socio-economic exclusion also plays a major role. High youth unemployment, poverty and migration pressures push young people to prioritize survival over civic engagement. Those from rural or marginalized backgrounds are particularly under-represented in cross-community initiatives.
The real issue mentioned is media polarization and misinformation deepen mistrust. Nationalist narratives dominate many outlets, while social media platforms amplify unverified content that discourages dialogue.
Suggestions for better youth engagement and participation
To overcome these barriers, several actions/solutions are needed.
First, cross-community youth programs should be decentralized and delivered in smaller towns, not only in capitals.
Second, youth consultation mechanisms must be formalized within the EU-facilitated dialogue framework, ensuring that youth perspectives are reflected in policy design.
Third, financial support should prioritize grassroots initiatives that bring together young Serbs and Albanians around shared social and economic challenges.
Finally, media literacy and bilingual education programs should be expanded to help young people critically assess information and communicate across divides. With addressing and applying these structural constraints, youth can become genuine positive contributors of normalization process in Kosovo.
Conclusion
The normalization process between Serbia and Kosovo will remain fragile as long as it is understood primarily as a technical and political negotiation detached from the social realities of the people it is meant to serve. Over the past decade, the dialogue has been shaped largely by high-level meetings, diplomatic language and international mediation frameworks, while the everyday concerns of young people (unemployment, restricted social mobility, segregated education systems and limited opportunities for participation) have been marginalized. This disconnect has contributed to widespread skepticism and a perception that the process lacks relevance for ordinary citizens.
Young people, however, are not merely future beneficiaries of peace; they are present-day actors with the capacity to reshape narratives, monitor implementation of agreements and build trust across divided communities. They are the largest social group affected by the outcomes of the dialogue, and their attitudes, experiences and expectations will define the prospects for long-term reconciliation. Treating youth as passive observers or symbolic participants undermines both the legitimacy and sustainability of the normalization process.
The findings discussed throughout this paper demonstrate that youth engagement is not an optional add-on but a prerequisite for meaningful progress. Where young people are given space to cooperate across ethnic and political lines, they challenge dominant nationalist narratives, humanize the “other side” and translate abstract political commitments into tangible community-level change. Conversely, when their voices are excluded, the dialogue risks becoming detached from social realities, reinforcing apathy and mistrust.
For this reason, engaging young people and recognizing their active participation into the normalization process is essential. This means institutionalizing youth consultation mechanisms, supporting youth-led monitoring initiatives, investing in non-formal education and cross-community exchanges, and ensuring that young people from rural and marginalized backgrounds are included too. It also requires recognizing that reconciliation is a generational endeavor that cannot be achieved solely through signatures on agreements.
Ultimately, the normalization process between Serbia and Kosovo is not only about resolving political disputes; it is about rebuilding relationships and creating a shared future. If young people continue to be sidelined, the dialogue will struggle to gain social legitimacy. If they are meaningfully engaged as partners and equal citizens, however, youth can become the most powerful drivers of sustainable peace and reconciliation in the Western Balkans.
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This publication was produced with the support of the Open Society Institute – Sofia through the “Think Tanks for the Future of EU Enlargement Program” (TFEP). The contents of this publication are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Open Society Institute – Sofia or the European Policy Centre (CEP) and Sbunker as partner organisations in charge of the implementation of the project Supporting the EU enlargement through the normalisation process between Serbia and Kosovo: Civil society as a driver of progress.
