A contradiction has emerged between the lofty ideals of the EU as a peace project and the complicated reality of integrating states without full control over their territory or international recognition over their borders. The Russian invasion of Ukraine raises the stakes further on this question of territorial integrity and EU enlargement. Despite the EU’s rhetorical recognition of Ukraine’s constitutionally enshrined European aspirations and prioritization of its accession negotiations, the implications of the occupation of much of its territory by Russia on its participation in the EU remain unclear and unresolved.
The structure of the EU enlargement process, particularly the need for multiple unanimous decisions in the Council, dictates that the accession of states facing territorial integrity issues can only proceed after the emergence of political consensus among EU member states. One can draw on prior precedents from other past and present EU aspirants, such as Cyprus, where compromise in the Council at the 1999 Helsinki Summit unblocked its 2004 accession; and Kosovo[1], where lack of consensus among member states regarding its independence from Serbia continues to stall its application. These two cases from Southeast Europe demonstrate that enlargement progress of candidates with territorial integrity issues depends on consensus among member states in the Council. One can then reasonably predict that, regardless of the pace of negotiations with the Commission, the ultimate fate of Ukraine’s application will likely be dependent on political negotiations and dealmaking in the Council regarding support for Ukraine’s wartime efforts.
At first glance, Ukraine’s application process seems to be moving much more quickly on paper than its fellow candidate states in the Western Balkans, who have languished in candidate purgatory for over a decade. While Montenegro, Serbia, and Albania waited two (2008-2010), three (2009-2012), and five years (2009-2014), respectively, to receive candidate status, Ukraine received this designation after only four months (2022). While Albania, for example, then waited ten years afterwards to start accession negotiations (2014-2024), Ukraine was able to move ahead to this stage in only two (2022-2024). The quick pace of Ukraine’s application can be interpreted as the result of a grand geopolitical imperative to affirm symbolically the European aspirations of Ukraine as it struggles to resist Russian domination.
Furthermore, nothing in the official communications from the Commission regarding Ukraine’s EU applications implies that the candidate’s lack of territorial integrity will pose a bureaucratic obstacle. That is not to say, of course, that Ukraine’s trajectory will be smooth sailing, but when it comes to the issue of territorial integrity alone, it is remarkable how little both the Commissions’ 2022 Opinion on Ukraine and its Ukraine Report refer to the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory. For example, the 2022 Opinion does not cite the occupation as a negative factor against Ukraine’s membership prospectus or the imperative to regain lost territory as a recommendation for membership preparation.[2] Similarly, the 2024 monitoring report does not link the occupation to any of the negotiating chapters, stating only that Ukraine must “finalise and implement the state policy strategy for restoring power and reintegrating the population of the occupied territories to ensure that careful attention is paid to the safeguarding of fundamental rights when reintegrating territories currently outside government control” — a recommendation that focuses less on the need to reclaim lost territory outright, but rather the imperative to respect human rights if or when such reintegration were ever to happen.[3]
It remains unclear whether this lack of conditionality is deliberate — perhaps in accordance with the aforementioned Protocol 10 of the 2003 Treaty of Athens establishing the precedent of an EU entrant unable to implement the acquis in an occupied territory — or a simple omission. Regardless, it does not appear that the Russian occupation of Ukrainian territory will doom Ukraine’s negotiations with the Commission.
This apparent apathy of the Commission towards Ukraine’s lack of territorial integrity, however, stands in contrast to the lack of consensus among member states in the Council regarding the preferred approach to resolving the Russian invasion of these regions. At first, the member states of the EU initially rallied unanimously behind Ukraine’s sovereignty, a show of unity that extended beyond simple rhetorical support as the Council also voted unanimously to impose multiple rounds of sanctions on Russia, provide humanitarian support to Ukraine, and, most relevant to this paper, grant Ukraine EU candidate status.[4]
Gradually, after the initial swings of the war stabilized after the fall of 2022, the Ukrainian summer counteroffensive stalled in 2023, and the war settled into a stalemate by 2024. This unity among the member states of the Council started to fray. Leaders of the EU states representing the political mainstream, such as Emmanuel Macron of France, Olaf Scholz of Germany, and Donald Tusk of Poland, have continued their strong material and rhetorical support of Ukraine’s sovereignty, while populist-nationalist leaders such as Viktor Orbán of Hungary and Robert Fico of Slovakia have increasingly disparaged the idea of unconditional support for Ukraine’s effort to expel Russia from its territory, advocating rather for a quick end to the war.
The pro-Ukraine declarations from Macron[5] and Scholz[6] can be seen as a form of “rhetorical entrapment”,[7] by which these leaders’ bold initial support for Ukraine’s European aspirations in 2022 has removed the ability to re-evaluate such a stance as the strategic landscape of the war has changed. On the contrary, Ukraine skeptics in Council member states have doubled down on their push for a ceasefire agreement at the potential expense of territory, with Orbán visiting Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in July 2024 as part of a shuttle diplomacy to offer Hungary as a mediator, and Fico making a similar visit in December 2024 to offer Slovakia as a “neutral” venue for potential negotiations.[8] Perhaps the explanation for the deepening of these states’ Ukraine-skeptic positions might lie in their national interest as major consumers of Russian energy exports, as shown by the focus of Fico’s visit to Moscow on renewing a deal with Gazprom to renew natural gas supplies to Slovakia, which ultimately expired.
Therefore, if we apply our institutional framework from earlier in the paper, this deepening divergence of member-state opinion in the Council regarding support for Ukraine’s efforts to reclaim territory does not bode well for Ukraine’s EU accession negotiations. While Ukraine might continue to progress through technical negotiations with the Commission, there is no reason to believe that Ukraine-skeptics such as Orbán and Fico will not repeat their previous obstructions of Ukraine-related votes in the Council, including those needed to advance its EU candidacy, regardless of the recommendations of the Commission. Specifically, it is unlikely that Hungary and Slovakia will change their calculations of national interest on a whim without a significant development in the conflict. Therefore, the only way for Ukraine’s application to proceed under these conditions would be through a political compromise among EU member states in the Council regarding the resolution of the territorial conflict in Ukraine, which in practice would take the form of adherence to any conditions spelled out in a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine. In particular, to provide a political stimulus for the emergence of consensus on Ukraine’s EU application, such a deal should explicitly spell out conditions for Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, which will certainly be a complex point of negotiation given Russia’s staunch opposition to the Euro-Atlantic integration of Ukraine.
[1] This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/1999 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.
[2] European Commission, “Opinion on Ukraine’s application for membership of the European Union”, June 16th, 2022, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/opinion-ukraines-application-membership-european-union_en.
[3] European Commission, “Ukraine Report 2024,” October 30th, 2024, 37, https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/ukraine-report-2024_en#details.
[4] “Timeline – EU Response to Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine,” European Council, accessed January 7, 2025, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/eu-response-russia-military-aggression-against-ukraine/timeline-russia-military-aggression-against-ukraine/?taxonomyId=6b7901c5-1094-4713-add8-3364400eee98.
[5] Presidency of the French Republic, “Meeting between M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic, and Mr Volodymyr Zelenskyy, President of Ukraine,” news release, December 19, 2024, https://uk.ambafrance.org/Supporting-Ukraine-is-France-s-absolute-priority-says-President.
[6] The White House, “Remarks by President Biden and Chancellor Olaf Scholz of Germany in Joint Statements to the Press,” news release, October 18th, 2024, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/10/18/remarks-by-president-biden-and-chancellor-olaf-scholz-of-germany-in-joint-statements-to-the-press-berlin-germany/.
[7] Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 55, no. 1, (2001): 72-76.
[8] “Slovakia says ready to host Russia-Ukraine peace talks,” France24, December 27, 2024, https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20241227-slovakia-says-ready-to-host-russia-ukraine-peace-talks-1.
