“The institution significantly contributed to the violation of human rights”, claimed Slovakia’s Prime Minister Robert Fico after approving the use of a fast-track legislative process to shut down the Special Prosecutor’s Office (SPO). Formerly responsible for investigating corruption and serious crimes, it secured numerous high-profile convictions involving Fico’s SMER-SD party representatives. Framing it as an initiative to “restore justice”, SMER accused the SPO of human rights violations, promoting punitive rather than rehabilitative justice, abusing its power by exhibiting political bias against the SMER officials (Domin, 2024; Jochecova, 2023).
In December 2023, SMER Justice Minister Boris Susko proposed an anti-corruption law and amendments to the Criminal Code, including the abolition of the SPO and the reduction of penalties for financial crimes. The government fast-tracked its approval process in January 2024. The revised law took effect on March 15, 2024.
European Union criticisms:
This reform sparked criticism within the European Union as it violates fundamental EU principles. First, it raises concerns about democratic representation due to the unjustified use of the accelerated legislative process with minimal consultation, bypassing the national parliament, experts, civil society, and the European Commission. Second, it weakens the fight against corruption: beyond dismantling the SPO, which was responsible for investigating corruption, the new law reduces penalties for financial crimes, increasing the risk of misuse of EU funds. Third, it threatens media freedom and pluralism, by restructuring anti-corruption offices, it raises concerns about journalists’ ability to report on corruption without fear of reprisal (European Commission, 2024; European Parliament, 2024).
Most critically, these measures violate several articles of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which Slovakia agreed to upon joining the EU. By suppressing independent checks and balances, it contradicts Article 2 TEU, which enshrines anti-corruption principles. By targeting certain judges, it undermines judicial independence, violating Article 19 TEU. And
by bypassing cooperation with EU institutions, it breaches Article 4(3) TEU, which upholds the principle of loyal cooperation between national governments and the EU (Parlement européen, 2024).
Yet, the implementation of such a reform once again raises questions on the EU institutions’ ability to prevent democratic backsliding in member states. Legal mechanisms and economic sanctions have proven limited, further exacerbated by the EU’s slow response, resistance from national governments on imposing penalties and the lack of tangible and case-specific sanctions.
Russian-orchestrated destabilisation attempt of the EU?
SMER behaviour suggests they employed disinformation techniques to mislead citizens a few months before the presidential elections. Framed within the context of “campaign politics”, the campaign contained unreliable promises to “restore justice” as they are persuasion tactics to attract voters. While the party did act, it focused on decreasing the exposure of corruption rather than combating corruption itself, thereby misleading citizens: a lack of awareness does not mean that corruption doesn’t exist. The anti-corruption law, aiming to dissolve the anti-corruption office, is misleading.
This law acts as lawfare, destabilizing and weakening the EU. Through disinformation, it fuels political division, undermines EU values, challenges the primacy of EU law over national legislation, and exploits its vulnerabilities, such as preventing democratic backsliding. Slovakia reformed its justice system upon joining the EU to align with rehabilitative justice, yet reducing sentences for serious crimes, as the new law does, is misleadingly framed as a continuation of these values, which Slovakia already upholds. This reflects a push for greater national law-making autonomy at the expense of EU principles, threatening EU member states unity. In this context, the new law aligns with Russian anti-Western narratives, raising concerns over potential Russian-backed destabilization attempts.
Such an initiative further serves oligarchic interests, resembling Russian political tactics. With the SPO’s dissolution, its responsibilities were transferred to the General Prosecutor’s Office, operating under the government’s authority, resembling past communist government centralized power structures. In Russia, legal checks and balances are also state controlled,
favoring elites’ interests, like when Navalny opposed the Russian government and was imprisoned on corruption-related charges and political repression, as Fico dismantled the SPO to halt investigations into his party. By nullifying the SPO’s autonomy, Slovakia is democratically backsliding and mimics Russian-style governance. When governments prioritise their own interests over the population’s, civic engagement can safeguard democracy.
Popular mobilisation:
Slovakia’s historically weak protest culture, shaped by its former Soviet alignment and low trade union density, makes recent demonstrations particularly significant, with 27,000 protesters gathering in Bratislava on 25th January 2024 alone (Reuters, 2024). The population’s growing role as a check on power explains why politicians attempt to bypass societal scrutiny through fast-tracked lawmaking and media reforms, prioritizing political interests over the public will. Widespread public opposition to political reforms reveals political fragmentation and recalls that democratic backsliding is gradual. Slovakians still can protest, but this is not to be taken for granted if the government continues to pursue personal interests. Georgia’s situation illustrates the liberty at stake, as the 100 days of protests are yet to reignite talks for EU accession (Saganelidze, Koridze, 2025).
In fine, by dissolving the SPO and reducing penalties for financial crimes under the anti-corruption law, the government fails to uphold its commitment to EU principles enshrined in the TEU articles. The increasing centralization of power to serve oligarchic interests, fueled by disinformation and anti-EU lawfare, mirrors Russia’s governance tactics and narrative. Amid a seemingly rising Russian influence, the civil society is increasingly emerging as a crucial actor of the checks and balances system. In today’s fast-paced, globalized, and technology-driven world, the reconstruction of past political structures may offer a sense of stability to pro-Fico voters. However, it simultaneously poses a serious threat to democracy, highlighting that, rather than the SPO, it is the government itself that has “significantly contributed to the violation of human rights.”
Bibliography:
Domin, M. (2024) ‘Abolition of the Special Prosecutor’s Office in Slovakia: Violation of the Rule of Law in the Name of Protecting Human Rights?’, Constitutionnet. Available at:
https://constitutionnet.org/news/voices/abolition-special-prosecutor-office-slovakia-violation- rule-law (Accessed: 6 March 2025).
European Commission. (2024) 2024 Rule of Law Report, Country Chapter on the rule of law situation in Slovakia. Brussels: European Commission.
European Parliament. (2024) Parliament concerned about the rule of law in Slovakia [Press release]. 17 January. Available at:
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20240112IPR16770/parliament-concern ed-about-the-rule-of-law-in-slovakia (Accessed: 7 March 2025).
Jochecova, K. (2023) ‘Slovakia’s plan to scrap prosecutor’s office prompts rule-of-law concerns in Brussels’, Politico. Available at:
https://www.politico.eu/article/slovakia-pm-fico-rule-of-law-concern-smer-partys-eu-brussels
-over-plan-scrap-special-prosecutors-office/ (Accessed: 6 March 2025).
Parlement européen. (2024) Résolution du Parlement européen du 17 janvier 2024 sur la dissolution prévue des principales structures anti-corruption en Slovaquie, et les répercussions sur l’état de droit (2023/3021(RSP)). Strasbourg: Parlement européen.
Reuters. (2024) ‘Slovak lawmakers to fast-track criminal law reforms debate as protests continue’, Reuters. Available at:
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/slovak-lawmakers-fast-track-criminal-law-reforms-de bate-despite-objections-2024-01-25/ (Accessed: 9 March 2025).
Saganelidze, M, Koridze, D. (2025). ‘Georgia’s 100 Days Of Protest’, Radio Free Europe. Available at:
https://www.rferl.org/a/georgia-protests-100-days-unrest-eu-accession/33338991.html (Accessed: 9 March 2025).
