Three years have passed since President Vucic and Prime Minister Kurti accepted the latest agreement as part of the normalisation dialogue proposed by the EU. The Agreement on Path to Normalisation was facilitated by EUSR at that time, Miroslav Lajcak, and EU High Representative Joseph Borell. What has been interesting regarding this agreement, beside the fact that it was never signed and there are serious challenges with its implementation, is actually how the agreement is referred to.
Under the auspices of the normalization dialogue, more than 30 agreements have been reached. However, none of them has so many different versions of referring. The Agreement on Path to Normalization Between Kosovo and Serbia, which is its full title, has at least five different names. Each of them has a different background, meaning and perspective. Depending on which name of the agreement one is using, the position of the person using its, his or her stances and expectations from the process can be easily tracked. This text tries to explain it in a more detail.
Franco-German Proposal
High-ranking diplomats from France and Germany had been working on a proposal for months and negotiating closely with Belgrade and Pristina. The EU later adopted this proposal and officially introduced it as a platform for the continuation of the dialogue.
Visits by French and German diplomats were often seen in Belgrade and Pristina as arm-twisting, and the proposals were accepted reluctantly. That is why in Serbia, when this name is used, it depicts an extremely negative attitude toward the agreement. On the other hand, the Franco-German Proposal is not frequently used in Kosovo and does not have underlying meaning there, as it is the case in Serbia.
Brussels 2.0 / Brussels Agreement II
The Agreement on the Path to Normalisation is often seen as the most important or one of the most important agreements in the whole of the normalization process. It marked a significant shift in the dialogue, similar to what the Agreement on Principles Governing the Normalisation of Relations (known as the Brussels Agreement) signed in 2013. This agreement marked the shift from a technical dialogue to a political one. In the same manner, experts argue that the 2023 Agreement is significant as it opens the status question for the first time.
Having in mind this structural similarity of two agreements – being instrumental and distinctive in comparison to all others – the 2023 Agreement is often referred to as Brussels 2.0 or the Brussels Agreement II. The logic behind this idea is that since 2013 Brussels Agreement has been the guiding document in the normalization process, while the 2023 agreement takes this role from the decade-old agreement. Additionally, since the main body of the 2023 Agreement has been agreed in Brussels, it got a nickname, Brussels Agreement 2.0 or Brussels II.
Usage of the Brussels Agreement 2.0 mostly depicts a neutral stance in both Serbia and Kosovo. However, this referral to the 2023 Agreement means that it is a build-up of the 2013 Brussels Agreement, which serves as a foundation of the normalization process.
Basic Agreement
The Agreement on the Path to Normalisation was drafted using the 1972 Basic Treaty between East and West Germany as a model. If one closely compares two documents, the resemblance is incredible. As if the country names have been changed, while keeping the majority of the other text.
However the text of the agreement is not the main issue, but the expected outcomes, which might be very similar in the Kosovo-Serbia and East-West Germany case. Key achievements of the 1972 Basic Treaty were: 1) de facto mutual recognition; 2) both countries joining the UN; 3) opening of “permanent representation” as a way of diplomatic relations. By reading the 2023 Agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, it seems that the agreement foresees identical outcomes.
The Basic Agreement is predominantly used in Pristina, especially in the government circles. Prime Minister Kurti has been using this term exclusively whenever he referred to the 2023 Agreement. However, what is problematic with this term is that it understands that the whole normalization process starts with this Agreement, neglecting all past agreements, including the Brussels Agreement (2013). What lies behind this is the refusal to establish the Association/Community of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASM), since the 2023 Agreement does not explicitly mention ASM, but only “an appropriate level of self-management for the Serbian community in Kosovo”.
This is the main reason why using the Basic Agreement might be dangerous and a point of contention in the future. On the other hand, this term is not utilised in Serbia at all.
Ohrid Agreement
The Ohrid Agreement is mostly used by experts both in Kosovo and Serbia as the Implementation Annex of the Agreement was reached at a meeting in Ohrid, North Macedonia. This was the last official meeting on a high political level where President Vucic and Prime Minister Kurti met. It is a neutral term, short and simple, used to clearly differentiate between the 2013 Brussels Agreement and the 2023 Agreement. It is very often used in academic literature and policy papers as well. Wider public in Serbia often refer it as the Ohrid Agreement, however, it should not be conflated with the 2001 Ohrid Agreement which ended the hostilities in FYR Macedonia (now North Macedonia).
Brussels-Ohrid Agreement
Similarly to the term Ohrid Agreement, the Brussels-Ohrid Agreement is more precise and avoids mixing with the 2013 Brussels Agreement or with the 2001 Ohrid Agreement. It is neutral and more or less frequently used in different circles, although less prominent than the Ohrid Agreement. Notably, the diplomatic community can be seen using this term.
The multiple names of the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation are not semantic accidents, but political signals. Each label reflects competing interpretations of the dialogue, its starting point, and its intended outcome, revealing more about the speaker’s expectations than about the text itself. As long as the agreement remains unsigned and selectively implemented, its naming will continue to mirror the unresolved nature of normalization itself.
