In February 2023, Kurti and Vucic accepted the draft in Brussels and met again in Ohrid to verbally agree on a roadmap for implementation in the following month. The Ohrid Agreement contains 11 provisions and cements autonomy as the preferred alternative to border modification. Whether this alternative will truly serve the interests of the people and ensure regional stability amid shifting geopolitics – namely from non-EU actors such as the Trump administration – remains to be seen.
Although formal recognition is not explicit, in Ohrid, Serbia pledged not to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organizations and not to represent Kosovo on the international stage. Additionally, it agreed to recognize Kosovo’s national symbols, passports, diplomas, license plates, and custom stamps. In return, Kosovo pledged to ensure an appropriate level of self-management for Kosovo Serbs and to protect the Serbian cultural heritage and the Orthodox Church properties within its borders.
When the Ahtisaari Plan was adopted, Kosovar leaders believed they had reached the maximum extent of autonomy that could be granted to Kosovo Serbs without undermining state functionality. Kurti frequently argued that the Association of Serb Majority Municipalities (ASM) would create “a state within a state,” potentially enabling the kind of obstructionism seen with Republika Srpska in Bosnia. Instead, he supports a model similar to that of Croatia, which provides limited cultural and educational autonomy. Kurti has proposed a non-territorial ASM regulated under Kosovo’s NGO laws, which acknowledges Kosovo’s independence, unitary structure, and territorial integrity.
Several ASM drafts have been proposed by various actors. Many of them, particularly the EU’s, align closely with Kosovo’s existing legal framework on municipal cooperation. With Kurti – the most vocal opponent of the ASM – now having accepted the Ohrid Agreement, its implementation seems inevitable and simply a technical matter. However, the deadlock persists over how the agreement will be executed, as both sides demand firm guarantees.
Kosovo views universal recognition of its independence and full internal sovereignty as central objectives. It seeks to control its borders fully and dismantle the parallel structures, in addition to recognition from as many states and organizations as possible. Recognition from the remaining EU non-recognizers, and NATO and EU accession top the agenda.
The reluctance to make concessions stems from a deep-rooted belief that Belgrade seeks instruments to undermine its authority. This distrust intensified when Vucic refused to sign the Ohrid Agreement, despite the EU’s insistence that the deal had entered into force with his verbal consent. Many in Kosovo remain unconvinced, and EU’s assurances that the deal is legally binding even without a signature failed to dispel doubts. Serbia’s vote against Kosovo’s Council of Europe membership, only one month after the agreement was reached, coupled with subsequent clear violations of key provisions, have further reinforced these concerns. Not to mention that, in April 2025, Serbia signed a mutual defense agreement with Hungary, yet another cause for concern. This defense agreement followed the one previously signed between Kosovo, Albania and Croatia, further increasing distrust.
In October 2023, EU leaders explicitly called on Serbia to deliver de facto recognition, marking the first time that this demand was stated openly rather than implied. However, high-ranking Serbian officials have continued their diplomatic resistance, with Vucic explicitly stating that Serbia will never recognize Kosovo, neither de jure nor de facto. Both the EU and the US believe that Kosovo should be the first to deliver its commitments, yet so far, the EU has failed to provide credible guarantees that Kosovo’s concessions will be reciprocated.
Kosovars have developed mistrust toward the EU because of years of unmet promises. Although the EU Commission had confirmed that all visa liberalization criteria were met in July 2018, it took 6 years until the liberalization finally occurred in January 2024, leaving the citizens of Kosovo the only isolated Europeans in the Western Balkans for 14 years. Similarly, in June 2024, EU HR Josep Borrell acknowledged that Kosovo had fulfilled the conditions for lifting EU restrictive measures adopted in June 2023, but sanctions have not been lifted. If the EU requires six years to deliver on visa liberalization and is incapable to lift its own sanctions, how will Serbia’s de facto recognition lead to formal recognition by the five non-recognizing member states?
The EU is frequently criticized for maintaining stabilitocracy in the Western Balkans through pursuing an appeasement policy toward strongmen who ensure order, even at the expense of democracy. By prioritizing short-term order over long-term reform, this realpolitik approach encourages similar behavior across the region. In March 2025, Kosovo, Albania, and Croatia signed a mutual defense agreement, and more states expressed interest. This move clearly suggests that the trust in the European political and security architecture is eroding, and Southeast European states are pursuing other alternatives to safeguard national interests.
To prevent regional instability and maintain the EU’s legitimacy as a peace-building project, it is essential to tackle the legal and political aspects related to Kosovo’s independence. The EU must ensure that Kosovo’s accession – and of the entire Western Balkans for that matter – is assessed on merit, based on each country’s ability to meet membership criteria. Political disputes or obstruction by uncooperative states should not be allowed to derail the European future of an entire region seeking stability, reform, and integration. Decisions have been made, and now is the time to act, not to passively remain disoriented and convene a second Thessaloniki Summit only after the region reemerges from armed conflict again.
