Bulgaria has been grappling with political turmoil since the April 2021 legislative elections, marked by unstable coalitions, ephemeral governments, and increasing strain on institutions that safeguard democratic principles. The judiciary, purportedly independent, has succumbed to politicization, failing to meet both domestic expectations and the reform benchmarks established by the European Commission during this period of upheaval. As outlined in this article, Bulgaria’s judiciary—integral to the democratic framework—is at a pivotal point, where there is a significant risk of it transforming into an instrument of political domination rather than serving as a bastion of the rule of law. Immediate, targeted reforms are imperative to restore its autonomy and integrity.
Politicization of Judiciary: A Legal Perspective
Courts have played a more significant role in determining public policy and resolving political conflicts worldwide. However, when their independence is threatened, they become vulnerable to political meddling (Ferejohn, 2002). The 2021 constitutional amendments that restructured the Supreme Court by merging its administrative and classification divisions and established legislative quotas for judicial nominations significantly heightened awareness of this problem in Bulgaria. This has consequently fuelled accusations of ‘court-packing.’
Bulgaria’s 2021 constitutional revisions undermined the concept of separation of powers. This reform created a system of quotas for judicial appointments, giving the National Assembly more authority over the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), which is in charge of appointing and disciplining judges. This type of reform is similar to what happened in Poland, where parliamentary control over judge selections led to legal challenges before the EU Court of Justice (Commission v. Poland, C-619/18, C-791/19).
The reform of Bulgaria’s Supreme Court, which combined the administrative and classification divisions, increased the centralization of judicial authority. As a result of this reorganization, allegations of ‘court-packing’ to obtain judicial bodies in favor of the ruling coalition arose. These events are similar to the judicial crisis in Romania in 2018 when attempts to shield corrupt officials from punishment through legislation sparked demonstrations and drew attention from the EU (Shetreet & Chodosh, 2024).
Recent events further underscore the mounting pressure on Bulgaria’s legal system. Following a clash with political figures, the highly publicized dismissal of Chief Prosecutor Ivan Geshev in June 2023 laid bare the troubling intersection between prosecutorial independence and political influence. His removal raised concerns that disciplinary procedures were being misused as a tool to purge judicial officials deemed politically undesirable, rather than serving as a legitimate mechanism for ensuring accountability. This scenario closely parallels the 2018 dismissal of Laura Codruța Kövesi, Romania’s chief anti-corruption prosecutor, which was widely condemned as politically motivated and led to legal challenges concerning prosecutorial independence and the separation of powers before the European Court of Human Rights (Kövesi v. Romania, App. No. 3594/19, ECtHR, 5 May 2020). The European Court found that Kövesi’s dismissal had violated her rights under Article 6 (right to a fair trial) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Judicial politicization has been made possible by this protracted volatility as political players try to increase their power during uncertainty. Under these circumstances, the court no longer serves as an impartial arbitrator of legal issues but progressively becomes a contentious space for political power. This dynamic is not unique to Bulgaria. Similar patterns have been seen in Hungary, with judicial governance institutions being methodically altered to place the court under governmental power. An analogous example could be the continuous conflicts in Spain over the makeup and renewal of the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ), where judicial independence arises when political bargaining is allowed to influence appointment procedures. These parallels underscore the universality of the issue and the need for a response.
Public Trust and Legal Certainty
Public trust and judicial independence are closely related since public confidence in the legal system is based on views of fairness and impartiality. According to Alpha Research, public trust in the judiciary in Bulgaria has drastically declined, with a 2023 drop of less than 20%. Persistent political meddling and several high-profile judicial scandals have contributed to this reduction by reinforcing that judges are biased and vulnerable to outside pressure. The scenario in Bulgaria is very similar to what happened in Romania during its contentious judicial reforms in 2018 and Hungary’s gradual decline in judicial independence after post-2014 legislative changes (Seibert-Fohr, 2012). A fundamental principle entrenched in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, legal certainty, which ensures access to an impartial tribunal and the predictability of judicial judgments, is undermined when there is a loss of trust in the judiciary (Merimaa, 2016).
The increasing hesitancy of individuals and corporations to depend on the courts as unbiased arbiters is one of the most significant consequences of deteriorating public confidence in the judiciary. Particularly among economic actors, the Bulgarian judiciary is increasingly seen as erratic, ineffective, or susceptible to political interference. Both foreign and domestic investment are discouraged by such views since companies look for stable and fair legal systems to safeguard their economic interests. This trend aligns with where it has been demonstrated that investor confidence is weakened, and perceptions of corruption, judicial inefficiency, and political meddling impede economic growth. The economic implications of the situation are grave, and urgent action is needed to restore trust in the judiciary.
Conflicting rulings on similar legal matters across various judiciary levels critically undermines legal clarity. Attorneys have observed instances in Bulgaria where lower courts issue decisions that deviate from the established precedents set by the Supreme Court. Such inconsistencies breed uncertainty for litigants and legal experts, escalating litigation costs as parties are forced to navigate prolonged legal disputes in search of clarity. This divergence is often the result of external influences on judges, ranging from corporate agendas to political pressures, that threaten judicial independence and hinder the consistent application of the law. As a result, the judicial branch’s vital role as a defender of the rule of law is significantly weakened, eroding the predictability and stability paramount for ensuring legal certainty.
Reports from solicitors clearly show that Bulgarian courts frequently postpone proceedings in high-profile cases involving public figures. These delays reinforce the perception of selective justice, indicating that individuals with political influence receive undue preference. Such practices not only violate the foundational democratic principle of equality before the law but also significantly undermine public trust in the judiciary’s ability to serve as an independent and impartial arbiter.
The risks of judicial politicization are evident when we examine experiences from other countries. In Poland, for instance, the politicization of the judiciary led to inconsistent rulings on judge retirement plans and electoral procedures, resulting in a marked decline in public confidence in the justice system’s reliability and coherence (Sadurski, 2019). Likewise, the integrity of the Turkish legal system was severely compromised when a large number of judges were arrested and dismissed following the failed coup attempt in 2016. This drastic action eroded judicial competence and weakened the consistency of legal decision-making (Human Rights Watch, 2018).
Electoral Integrity and Judicial Independence
Recent scandals involving the Central Election Commission (CEC) have intensified concerns about electoral integrity. Judicial challenges related to court rulings on poll recounts and candidate disqualifications have emerged, with opponents claiming that these outcomes disproportionately favored certain political parties. These assertions, or instead said facts, backed up by evidence shown on many news outlets around the nation, have increased skepticism about the judiciary’s impartiality in electoral disputes, given the inaction consequent from them. Such systematic issues, including vote-buying and deficiencies in candidate registration processes, have further exposed broader weaknesses in Bulgaria’s electoral system, which is viewed at home and abroad. Given the circumstances of this action or rather omissions, there have been voiced by international election observers such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (Kraft van Ermel, 2014). A similar pattern has emerged in Hungary, where the regime has solidified its control over democratic processes by frequently altering electoral rules to favor the governing party. At the same time, the judiciary consistently dismissed legal challenges (Lendvai-Bainton, 2017).
Conclusion
The increasing politicization of the judiciary carries significant legal implications that reach far beyond domestic governance. It undermines judicial independence and jeopardizes Bulgaria’s adherence to EU legislation. Consequently, Bulgaria risks joining the ranks of many illiberal governments where the judiciary lacks neutrality.
Bibliography
- Castillo-Ortiz, P. (2019). The politics of judicial independence in Spain and the United Kingdom: Is the meaning of judicial independence changing? European Constitutional Law Review, 15(3), 449–475. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1574019619000317
- European Court of Justice. (2019). Commission v. Poland (C-619/18). ECLI:EU: C:2019:531.
- European Court of Justice. (2021). Commission v. Poland (C-791/19). ECLI:EU: C:2021:596.
- Ferejohn, J. (2002). Judicializing Politics, Politicizing Law. Law and Contemporary Problems, 65(3), 41–68. https://doi.org/10.2307/1192402
- Human Rights Watch. (2018). Turkey: Government crackdown cuts deeper. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/turkey
- Lendvai-Bainton, N. (2017). Illiberal democracy or neoliberal authoritarianism? The case of Hungary. Contemporary Politics, 23(3), 306–324. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2017.1304314
- Linebarger, C., & Salehyan, I. (2020). Electoral integrity and election-related conflict. Democracy and Security, 16(3), 260–280. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2020.1787158
- Sadurski, W. (2019). Poland’s Constitutional Breakdown. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198840503.001.0001
- Scheppele, K. L. (2013). The rule of law and the Frankenstate: Why governance checklists do not work. Governance, 26(4), 559–562. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12049
- Seibert-Fohr, A. (Ed.). (2012). Judicial Independence in Transition. Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-28299-7
- Shetreet, S., & Chodosh, H. E. (Eds.). (2024). Judicial Independence: Cornerstone of Democracy. Brill. https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004535091
- OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. (2023). Bulgaria: Local elections – Needs assessment mission report. https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/bulgaria
- Merimaa, M. (2016). The Principle of Procedural Economy in the Estonian Civil Procedure. https://core.ac.uk/download/230910695.pdf
- Kraft van Ermel, N. (2014). Book review of Cristian Nünlist and David Svarin (eds.) Overcoming the East-West Divide: Perspectives on the Role of the OSCE in the Ukraine Crisis. https://doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02503006
- Nauman, S., Basit, A. A., & Imam, H. (2023). Examining the influence of Islamic work ethics, organizational politics, and supervisor-initiated workplace incivility on employee deviant behaviors. https://doi.org/10.1080/10508422.2023.2275200
- European Court of Human Rights. 2020. Kövesi v. Romania, App. No. 3594/19, Judgment of 5 May 2020. Available at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-202136.
