Introduction
The normalization of relations between Belgrade and Pristina has largely been driven by elite-level negotiations, exemplified by agreements such as the Brussels Agreement and the Ohrid Agreement. These top-down processes, conducted primarily between political leaders and facilitated by the European Union, aim to formalize political and institutional relations. However, such elite-driven approaches often overlook the everyday experiences of local communities where informal interactions, social networks and daily coexistence shape perceptions of security, trust and peace. This paper argues that everyday peace practices among local communities contribute to a form of bottom-up normalization that complements and exposes the limits of elite-level agreements. Sustainable normalization depends on the lived experiences, attitudes and perceptions of ordinary citizens, whose trust ultimately determines whether agreements can be meaningfully implemented.
The Main Agreements
The EU started actively pursuing the normalization of Kosovo-Serbia relations in 2011 with the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue. Kosovo declared independence in 2008, which Serbia does not recognize, blocking full regional and EU integration. Key agreements include the Brussels Agreement (2013), the Washington Agreement (2020) and the Ohrid Agreement (2023). While these agreements are strong on paper, implementation has often remained unclear. They oblige both parties to develop good-neighborly relations, mutually recognize documents, cooperate in the economy, judiciary, infrastructure and resolve disputes peacefully. Elite dialogue lays the foundation, but citizen-led initiatives remain crucial for practical normalization and trust-building.
How Citizens Percieve Normalization?
The situation in real life differs, especially recording to citizens. According to the research Trend Analysis 2023: Attitudes of the Serbian Community in Kosovo, more than 95% of respondents from Serbian communities believe that the situation in Kosovo is not progressing positively. Furthermore, 69% of respondents pointed to political instability as a key issue, while 83% expressed distrust toward all political parties. This data illustrates a profound lack of confidence in the political system and highlights challenges for community cohesion. “Public Pulse Brief #25 (UNDP Kosovo)” shows that everyday socio-economic issues like poverty, unemployment and rising prices remain the primary concerns across communities, indicating that peace is experienced first through daily survival rather than political agreements. As well, this study shows uneven experience of security- 85.3% of Kosovo Albanians report feeling safe in public spaces compared to only 31.9% of Kosovo Serbs, revealing how everyday peace is fragmented along community lines. The study also shows extremely low satisfaction with the judiciary, with only 27% expressing confidence in courts and 26% in the prosecutor’s office. This suggests that the absence of trusted local institutions undermines bottom-up normalization and long-term peace. Public confidence in the Belgrade-Pristina normalization process remains modest, with only 10% of respondents fully believing the agreement will positively affect their daily lives, highlighting the disconnect between elite dialogue and everyday realities. Since perceptions of corruption and governance are shaped primarily through media, “Trust Index 2025 (CASA)” shows that 82% of Albanians believe that Serbian media fuel tensions, while 79% see the Serbian government as responsible for tensions between Albanians and Serbs. Additionally, 36% of Albanians would not want contact with a member of the other community, indicating a deep ethnic divide. The formation of the Community of Serbian Municipalities remain unsolved issue among both sides, especially Serbian people. “Perceptions of Compromise in the Normalization Process Between Kosovo and Serbia” indicates that 70 % of Albanians see the Community of Serbian Municipalities (CSM) as a threat to Kosovo, and 74 % consider Serbia responsible for poor relations between Albanians and Serbs in the country. The majority of the Albanian public does not support the creation of the CSM because it is perceived as a political and security threat, meaning that the agreement could not be fully realized without broader support from civil society and public opinion. Political agreements in multi-ethnic societies heavily depend on the backing of civil society and the general population, and no matter how good and good crafted agreement is claimed by many, it fails to be implemented because the key is the trust among the citizens in the first place. Some scholars claim that obstacles in the implementation of agreements are created by both Serbia and Kosovo, as well as EU passivity, are most to blame for the failure to take the 2023 normalisation deal between the two countries forwards and that normalisation deal is still unimplemented. In 2024, in the report Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue it is clear that there is some progress, which is happening very slowly, but it is inevitable that both futures are in EU. Brussels Times published text “Belgrade-Pristina dialogue: Why the EU-facilitated dialogue did not work” where the spokesperson admitted that the EU cannot force the parties to implement the normalisation agreement. Implementation has repeatedly stalled, most notably with the continued non-establishment of the Association/Community of Serb Municipalities. The dialogue suffers from vague formulations, power imbalances and weak enforcement mechanisms, allowing both sides to delay commitments without real consequences, which sustains mistrust and freezes normalization rather than resolving it.
Civil society
As noted by Frauke M. Seebass and Marina Vulović in their analysis, “the EU has always lacked a profound engagement with civil society and change-makers on the ground”, highlighting the need for practical, locally owned solutions to address the pressing needs of communities in Serb-majority municipalities in Kosovo. The authors emphasize that civil society plays a crucial role in sustaining normalization from below, by defending minority rights, fostering interethnic dialogue and maintaining channels of communication when political processes stall. Despite years of elite-driven negotiations, everyday normalization between Kosovo and Serbia has often relied on bottom-up initiatives led by civil society and local actors. Programs such as the Winter School in North Mitrovica bring together young professionals, activists and students from both communities to engage in dialogue, joint workshops and capacity-building exercises, fostering trust and networks of cooperation that operate independently of formal political channels (CEP, 2025). Similarly, the Cross-Border Youth Dialogue (CYD) project, engaging over 1,000 youth and 50+ local NGOs with EU support, promotes exchanges, advocacy training and cultural projects that strengthen mutual understanding and reconciliation at the grassroots level (CYD, 2025). Networks like Civic Dialogue and initiatives funded through the Kosovar Civil Society Foundation (KCSF) provide platforms for hundreds of local organizations to organize workshops, debates and collaborative cultural events, directly enhancing interethnic communication and community resilience. These initiatives demonstrate that, even when elite dialogue stalls or faces political obstruction, local actors can maintain channels of interaction, foster trust and reduce tensions on the ground. At the same time, the reliance on external funding and fragmented networks shows the limits of bottom-up approaches, they are often not sustainable without institutional support, illustrating that grassroots efforts are complementary to, but cannot fully replace, formal political agreements. Incorporating these examples into analyses of the Belgrade-Pristina process highlights how everyday peace practices shape normalization from below, offering insights into the lived experiences that elite negotiations alone cannot address. These examples show that even when elite-level dialogue stalls, local actors maintain channels of interaction and help reduce tensions on the ground.
Conclusion
For the normalization process between Serbia and Kosovo to truly succeed, the EU needs to make agreements clear, practical and relevant to local communities. This means providing transparent reports of all commitments, regularly checking progress and creating practical roadmaps with specific deadlines and consequences for non-compliance. Active on-the-ground involvement through monitoring, mediation and support for local problem-solving is also essential. Public information campaigns and inclusive engagement of civil society, local communities, opposition parties and youth are crucial to ensure the process is meaningful, trusted and connected to the daily lives of ordinary citizens. Bottom-up initiatives led by civil society, youth programs and local organizations maintain channels of trust, cooperation, and everyday peace, showing that citizens’ daily interactions and grassroots efforts are just as fundamental to progress as high-level agreements. In line with my experience at the Winter School, I suggest organizing free-of-charge educational trips and excursions for students from Kosovo and Serbia, promoting firsthand understanding, dialogue, tolerance and mutual awareness. By combining well-defined agreements with locally owned solutions and grassroots initiatives, the EU and international actors can reduce tensions, prevent further marginalization and out-migration and ensure that normalization is lived and experienced, not just signed on the paper.
