“Shelter is an alliance relationship in which small states alleviate their political, economic, and social vulnerabilities by allying with large states and joining international or regional organisations” (Thorhallsson, Steinsson, 2017).
Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine in February 2022 has prompted a geopolitical awakening in the European Union (EU), reviving its role as a comprehensive shelter — economic, societal and political (military) — for small states and states in post-Soviet or contested border regions. Until 2022, the EU largely denied the existence of geopolitical competition with Russia. However, it has since moved away from its traditional role of mediator and facilitator. This article argues that the war in Ukraine reinvigorated the EU’s role as a shelter for vulnerable states by prompting energy, security, and political transformations, and by accelerating enlargement as a geopolitical imperative.
The EU, as a peace project primarily rooted in economic and societal integration, has expanded to include security and political protection in order to secure democracy and human rights. The current clash between the EU and Moscow is a way to ensure the latter’s democratic future. Therefore, it has rekindled the attractiveness of the EU as a shelter from Russia.
Ukraine was long torn between the EU and Russia, especially because of the oligarchs in the country, in part due to the dominant role of oligarchs in shaping foreign policy. These actors, motivated by profit, often sought to benefit from both sides by maintaining strategic ambiguity. Nevertheless, since 2014, when Putin seized Crimea, the West has been portrayed as a civilizational choice. This resulted in a rise of polls in favor of the EU (and NATO) and a decrease for Russia, leaving Ukraine’s colonial past behind and away from Russia’s imperial control. By trying to integrate Ukraine into its sphere of influence, Russia pushed it away.
Beyond the political realm, the war also exposed the fragility of the EU’s energy security, especially for small states and post-Soviet countries still depending on Russian energy. Small states are especially vulnerable to fluctuations in market prices because they lack diversity in their economic relationships and are very dependent on their partners. In response, the EU acted as an energy shelter, reinforcing gas networks and accelerating the energy transition for smaller economies. For example, Lithuania severed final Baltic power ties with Russia in February 2025 and connected to the EU’s power system via Poland. Similarly, during the so-called “Baltic Miracle” (2003–2007), the region benefited from EU economic shelter through financial support and integration into global markets, leading to growth rates of 8–12%.
The war was also a game changer for Europe’s security autonomy. The United States’ role in global politics, and especially within NATO, has been questioned since Trump’s presidency. Russian aggression has underscored NATO’s potential limitations, prompting European actors to consider alternatives for collective defence. Moreover, the changing nature of security threats (hybrid threats, cybercrime, proxy conflicts) necessitates a broader European strategy focused on resilience. Since 2022, the EU has taken a strong diplomatic stance regarding Ukraine in the United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). It also applied massive sanctions against Russia. The EU has demonstrated being ready to defend its vision of an international order based on democracy, human rights and international law. This model based on a voluntary accession to the EU without the use of force, unlike Russia, is more attractive to the EU’s neighbouring countries, such as Ukraine.
Thus, the “liberal empire” has become more attractive, and it accelerates the accession process for some countries. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia (known as the ‘Association Trio’) applied for EU membership a few days after Russia launched its invasion and their applications were processed at record speed. Moldova and Ukraine were granted candidate status in June 2022, and Georgia in December 2023. Although these steps are largely symbolic against the Russian aggression and represent only the beginning of a long negotiation process, they marked a clear political signal. The Association Trio joined the Western Balkans — Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia — on the waiting list for the EU. For many of these countries, long stalled in their candidacies, the war served as a stark reminder of their vulnerability and the urgency of aligning with a broader protective shelter. Thus, Russia’s aggression acted as a catalyst to reboot enlargement and expand the EU’s sheltering role to former Eastern European countries under Russian influence.
At the same time, enlargement fatigue continues to hinder progress. Following the “big bang” enlargement of the 2000s, the process is in slow-motion or at a standstill. Many candidates remain in a grey zone without promising EU accession and vulnerable to Russia’s influence and aggression. Without the membership incentive, the countries-candidates are less motivated to follow the EU’s vision for development, and public trust in the EU has eroded. Furthermore, welcoming new members — especially large states like Ukraine, which is geographically larger than France or Germany — would require significant internal reform. An EU of 30 or more members will need to adapt its institutions, budget, and power dynamics to absorb such changes. This presents a challenge for the bloc’s largest and most influential members, some of whom remain wary of rapid expansion. Therefore, future enlargement — and the sustainability of the EU’s sheltering capacity — will depend not only on the threats it faces but also on its willingness to reform from within.
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